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Survey of Professional Responsibility
ration to be targeted as a defendant. This trend has a threatening,
but somewhat necessary, effect on the attorney and client as indi-
viduals, as well as on the attorney-client privilege and relationship.
Colleen Graham
RULE 11 SANCTIONS: THE SUPREME COURT GIVES RULE 11 A
STRONGER BITE AND A LONGER LEASH
In its original form, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure established that an attorney's signature on a pleading consti-
tuted a certification that to the best of the attorney's " knowledge,
information and belief there is good ground to support it, and
that it is not interposed for delay." 1 The rule was promulgated to
I FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C.A. R. 11 (1938). The following text illustrates the additions
and deletions of the 1983 amendment (italics show additions, brackets deletions):
Rule 11. Signing of Pleadings, Motions, and Other Papers; Sanctions Every pleading,
motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at
least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A
party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading, motion, or other
paper and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or
statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in eq-
uity that the averments of an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony
of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abol-
ished. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he
has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, infor-
mation and belief [there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed
for delay] formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or
other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission
is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. [or is signed with intent to defeat the
purpose of this rule; it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed
as though the pleading had not been served. For a wilful violation of this rule an
attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may be
taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.] Ifa pleading, motion, or other paper
is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall
impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction,
which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable
expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
Proposed Amendment FED. R. Civ. P. 11, quoted at 97 F.R.D. 196-97 (1983).
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deter improper litigation practices by imposing ethical obligations
on attorneys.' Under Rule 11 attorneys were held to the standard
of subjective good faith.' When the rule was contravened, discre-
tionary imposition of sanctions by the court were permitted.'
However, Rule 11 sanctions were rarely imposed.5
Rule 11 was amended in 1983 in an effort to overcome judicial
reluctance to impose sanctions and to enhance the certification
obligations of attorneys.' The amended rule replaced the subjec-
s See Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 190 (1986). "Promulgated to
curb tendencies toward untruthfulness in pressing a client's suit, the effect of the rule was
to place a moral obligation on attorneys to satisfy themselves that good grounds existed for
the action or defense." Id. See also Carter, Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: How Go The Best Laid Plans?: The History and Purposes of Rule 11, 54 FORDHAM L.
REV. 4, (1985) (intent of original rule was to deter frivolous pleadings). Cf. Browne, The
Significance of the Signature: A Comment on the Obligations Imposed by Civil Rule 11, 30 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 385, 386 (1981) (Ohio Civil Rule 11 which parallels Federal Rule 11 "imposes
grave moral and ethical obligations upon attorneys.").
" Eg., Badillo v. Central Steel & Wire Co., 717 F.2d 1160, 1166-67 (7th Cir. 1983),
superceded by FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983) (Rule 11 required showing of subjective bad faith
required to trigger "disciplinary action"); Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 348-51 (2d
Cir. 1980) (subjective bad faith standard was applied to determine whether Rule was
violated).
I FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C. R. 11 (1938).Former Rule 11 provided that "[flora wilful
violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action." Id.
(emphasis added). See Vairo, supra note 2, at 191 (thorough discussion of differing stan-
dards for old and amended Rule 11); supra note 1 (text of Rule 11 prior to amendment of
1983). See generally Note, The Dynamics of Rule 11: Preventing Frivolous Litigation By Demand-
ing Professional Responsibility, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 300, 313-15 (1986) (discussing flaws of for-
mer Rule 11).
' See Vairo, supra note 2, at 191 (Rule 11 largely ignored); Miller & Culp, Federal Prac-
tice: Litigation Costs, Delays Prompted the New Rule of Civil Procedure, Nat'l L. J., Nov. 28,
1983, at 24, col. 3 (provisions of Rule were "not read enough, not demanding enough and
not honored enough"); Risinger, Honesty in Pleadings and its Enforcement: Some "Striking"
Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1976) (prior to 1983,
only handful of reported Rule 11 decisions); Schwarzer, Sanctions under the New Federal
Rule I1 -A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 183 (Rule 11 rarely invoked); 5A C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1331 n.9 (2d ed.1990) (Rule 11 rarely
utilized before 1983). Cf Brown v. Cameron-Boston Co., 30 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1181, 1189-
91 (E.D. Va. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 652 F.2d 375 (4th Cir. 1981) (court refused to
dismiss what it believed to be groundless claim, pursuant to Rule 11, because it was unable
to definitely determine if pleadings were "sham and false and devoid of factual basis").
Original Rule 11 was not effective in deterring abuse. See Joseph, The Trouble with Rule
11: Uncertain Standards and Mandatory Sanctions, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1, 1987, at 87 ("the 'safe
harbor' exception for subjective good faith swallowed the rule").
Former Rule 11 was limited in its application. It was applicable only to pleadings, it re-
quired a showing of bad faith and it provided for only two types of sanctions. See generally
Carter, supra note 2 (discussion of history, limitations and use of former Rule 11); Risinger,
Striking Problems, supra (same).
6 FED. R. Crv. P. 11 advisory committee note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983)
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tive standard with an objective one of "reasonableness under the
circumstances. ' 7 Amended Rule 11 mandates that violations be
punished, although courts have discretion as to who should be
sanctioned, and whether monetary or other sanctions should be
imposed. 8 In addition, the amended rule authorizes the award of
(referring to expanded nature of attorney's certification obligation). The Chairman of the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules stated that the amendment of Rule 11 was "designed
to minimize abuse in the signing of pleadings, motions and other papers through a more
precise definition of the standard to be met by the signing party or attorney and a require-
ment that sanctions be imposed for violations of these standards." (March 9 letter to Judge
Edward T. Gignoux, Chairman, and Members of the Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure). Id. at 190. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Clarke, 898 F.2d 318,
322 (2d Cir. 1990) ("In framing Rule 11 Congress intended to provide a prophylactic
against abuse of the adversary system by attorneys."). See generally Vairo, Analysis of August
1, 1983 Amendment to the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, ALI-ABA, 1 Civil Practice and
Effective Litigation Techniques in Federal and State Courts 59 (Aug 1985 ed.) (amend-
ment to Rule proposed to deter submission of groundless or frivolous motions); Carter,
supra note 2, at 4 (same); Subrin, The New Era in American Civil Procedure, 67 A.B.A. J.
1648 (1981) (same).
" FED R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983).
"The standard is one of reasonableness under the circumstances." Id. (emphasis added). See J.
MOORE & J. LucAs, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 11.02 [3] (1990) (principal change in stan-
dard is requirement of "reasonable inquiry"); Note, Insuring Rule 11 Sanctions, 88 MICH. L.
REV. 344, 348 (1989). Amended Rule 11 dictates that the signing attorney must: 1) make
"reasonable inquiry" into the facts 2) undertake "reasonable inquiry" into the law 3) must
not file papers with the court for any improper purpose. Id. See generally Thomas v. Capital
Social Servs. Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 873-74 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (general requirements of
Rule 11); Szabo Food Serv. Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1080 (7th Cir.1987)
(same), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 1101 (1988); Davis v. Veslan Enters., 765 F.2d 494, 497-98
n.4 (5th Cir. 1985) (standard under amended Rule 11 is objective one); Indianapolis Colts
v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 775 F.2d 177, 181 (7th Cir. 1985) (same).
8 See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990).
Determining whether an attorney has violated Rule 11 involves a consideration of
three types of issues. The court must consider factual questions regarding the nature
of the attorney's prefiling inquiry and the factual basis of the pleading or other pa-
per. Legal issues are raised in considering whether a pleading is 'warranted by ex-
isting law or a good faith argument' for changing the law and whether the attorney's
conduct violated Rule 11. Finally, the district court must exercise its discretion to
tailor an appropriate sanction.
Id. at 2457; supra note 1 (text of amended Rule 11). See also Insurance Benefit Adm'rs.,
Inc. v. Martin, 871 F.2d 1354, 1359 (7th Cir. 1989) (district court may impose wide range
of sanctions); Unioil Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 809 F.2d 548, 559 (9th Cir. 1986) (plain
meaning of Rule 11 clearly indicates sanctions are mandatory), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 822
(1987); Albright v. Upjohn Co., 788 F.2d 1217, 1222 (6th Cir. 1986) (same); Westmore-
land v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (same); Levin & Sobel, Achieving
Balance in the Developing Law of Sanctions, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 587, 589 (1987) (amended
Rule 11 sanctions are mandatory and may be imposed upon courts' initiative); Note, supra
note 7, at 378 (noting that in certain cases appropriate sanctions may be nonmonetary, for
example, "dismissing a pleading that violates the rule, reprimanding an attorney in a pub-
lished opinion, referring the attorney to a disciplinary body, or barring the attorney from
appearing in court"); Vairo, supra note 2, at 193 (Rule 11 provides for mandatory sanc-
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expenses, including the award of "a reasonable attorney's fee." 9
Commentators disagree as to whether the combined effects of ju-
dicial discretion and the objective standard of "reasonableness
under the circumstances" result in what amounts to a subjective
standard."1
Advocates of amended Rule 11 contend that it is necessary to
control widespread litigation abuse by attorneys, an important
consideration in the face of an overburdened federal court sys-
tem. 1 Critics of the rule focus on the potential dangers arising
tions). But see Schwarzer, supra note 5, at 200. "It is not likely that courts will consider
themselves bound by the rule's mandatory language to impose sanctions." Id. Cf. Burbank,
Sanctions in Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Questions About
Power, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 997, 1009 (1983) (questioning authority from which power to
impose mandatory sanctions arises); Joseph, Redrafting Rule 11, Nat'l L. J., Oct. 1,1990, at
14, col. 1 (suggesting mandatory sanctions may interfere with parties' settlement plans).
' FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983). See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note, reprinted in 97
F.R.D. 165, 168 (1983) (courts may "tailor sanctions to the particular facts of the case").
See also Ahern v. Central Pac. Freight Lines, 846 F.2d 47, 50 (9th Cir. 1988) (district court
was correct in assessing attorneys fees); Smith v. Egger, 108 F.R.D. 44, 45 (E.D. Ca. 1985)
(imposition of attorney's fees warranted under Federal Rule 11); Note, Applying Rule 11 to
Rid Courts of Frivolous Litigation Without Chilling the Bar's Creativity, 76 Ky. L.J. 891, 905-06
(1987-88). The court may sanction the attorney, the client or both. Id. "[T]he court retains
discretion to determine the appropriate sanctions ..... Id. See generally Levin & Sobel,
supra note 8, at 597-99 (application of sanctions under Rule 11).
"0 See infra note 31 (discussing subjective application of amended Rule 11). Compare
Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1271 (2d Cir. 1986) (standards for imposing sanc-
tions "have not always been either clear or consistently applied"), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
1373 (1987) and Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1013, 1015 (1988) ("In
interpreting and applying Rule 11, the courts have become a veritable Tower of Babel")
and Joseph, The Trouble with Rule 11: Uncertain Standards and Mandatory Sanctions, 73 A.B.A.
J., Aug. 1, 1987, at 87, 89 (practicing law under Rule 11 described as "negotiating a
minefield") and Mandelbaum, Amended Rule 11: Despite Wide Application Little Consensus Ob-
served, 3 INSIDE LrIMGATION (P.H.) 1, 18 (July 1989) (practicing law under Rule 11 described
as "playing a game of Russian roulette") with Greenberg v. Hilton Int'l Co., 870 F.2d 926,
934 (2d Cir. 1989) (party seeking sanctions need not show bad faith, rather test is "objec-
tive standard, focusing on what a reasonably competent attorney would believe"). Certain
general types of cases are more likely to result in sanction awards. See Cherin, The Actual
Operation of Amended Rule 11, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 18-19 (1985). Sanctions will likely be
imposed "where a relatively powerful party will use its economic leverage to oppress an
economically disadvantaged opponent." Id. "[Slanctions are often awarded in consideration
of an attorney's experience - either in terms of the number of years admitted to practice or
the degree of specialization and expertise he presumably has - as being inconsistent with
the type of pleading offered." Id. [S]anctions are often imposed when "a party has per-
sisted in bringing repeated harassing lawsuits against the same target." Id.
" See Johnson & Cassady, Frivolous Lawsuits and Defensive Responses to Them - What Relief
is Available?, 36 ALA. L. REV. 927, 927 n.1 (1985) (federal courts inundated with unprece-
dented number of lawsuits in past decade); Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule
11 - Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEo.
L.J. 1313, (1986) (pretrial stage of litigation characterized by "spiraling costs, delay and
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from Rule 1 1 decisions. Among these are the ensuing satellite liti-
gation, 2 the rule's potential misuse as a fee-shifting tool,'" and its
potential "chilling effect" on advocacy, 4 as well as its encroach-
abuse"). See, e.g., J. KAKALIK & A. ROBYN, CosTs OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM: COURT Ex-
PENDITURES FOR PROCESSING TORT CASES 49 (Rand Institute for Civil Justice 1982) (single
hour spent by federal judge in tort case costs government approximately $600); Rosenberg
& King, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough is Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 579
(1981) (increasing costs of federal litigation system). Cf. Schwarzer, supra note 5, at 204
(Rule 11 "part of an integrated system created by the federal rules for the just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of actions"); S Kassin, An Empirical Study of Rule 11 Sanctions 29
(Federal Judicial Center 1985) (Federal Judicial Center study finds several purposes to be
served by Rule: "to penalize the violator, to compensate the offended party, and to deter
others from engaging in similarly abusive conduct").
", See A. Miller, Remarks at Annual Judicial Conference at the Second Judicial Circuit of
the United States (Sept. 30, 1983), reprinted in 101 F.R.D. 161, 200 (1984) (potential for
sideshow series of hearings and appeals resulting from Rule 11 sanctions); Levin & Sobel,
supra note 8, at 606 ("Sanctions for discovery abuse . . . could in theory give rise to the
need for several rounds of discovery to challenge the need for sanctions, to dispute the
selected sanctions, and to mitigate the severity of proposed sanctions."); Schwarzer, supra
note 10, at 1017-18 (excessive amount of litigation "spawned" by Rule 11 due to its "in-
herent unpredictability and the readiness of lawyers to resort to any device available to
exert pressure on their opponents"). The threat of satellite litigation was apparent to the
drafters of the amended rule. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes, reprinted in
97 F.R.D. 165, 201 (1983). They sought to ensure that "efficiencies achieved through
more effective operation of the pleading regimen will not be offset by the cost of satellite
litigation ...." Id. The Supreme Court recognized the potential for ensuing satellite litiga-
tion subsequent to the imposition of sanctions. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Group, 110
S. Ct. 2447, 2462 (1990). The Court noted that allowing sanctions in the context of ap-
peals may result in encouraging satellite litigation. Id.
"8 See Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 419 (7th Cir. 1988) (Rule 11 described
as "fee-shifting statute"); Levinson, Frivolous Cases: Do Lawyers Really Know Anything At All?,
24 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 353, 373 (1986) ("Rule 11 in form requires sanctions such as fee
shifting . . ."). But see White v. General Motors, 908 F. 2d 675 (10th Cir.1990) (sanctions
may include attorney's fees, but there is no "entitlement to full compensation"). But cf.
Note, supra note 4, at 315 ("Fee-shifting, especially when directed at attorneys personally,
provides an economic control against frivolity that is otherwise lacking in the American
system.").
" See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985)
(court does "not intend to stifle the enthusiam or chill the creativity that is the very life-
blood of the law"), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987); Erie Conduit Corp. v. Metropolitan
Asphalt & Paving Ass'n, 106 F.R.D. 451, 459 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (courts particularly con-
cerned with "chilling effect on potentially meritorious actions" that sanctions may have);
N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1986, at 30-31 (Rule may be deterring creative and novel theories;
effect not intended by drafters). Cf. S. Medina, M. Henifin & T. Cone, A Preliminary
Analysis of Reported Decisions Applying the 1983 Amendments for Rules 11, 16, 26 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Aug. 28, 1984, at 16 (available at Columbia Law
School Library) (highest number of sanction motions were brought in civil rights cases);
Comment, Sanctions Unwarranted By Existing Law, 52 BROOKLYN L. REV. 609, 640-41 (1986)
(our system of common-law operates according to stare decisis, but occasionally decision
can completely reverse existing precedent, so existing law is never fixed). See generally
Note, supra, note 9, at 891 (discussing Rule lI's potential "chilling effects" on innovative
and enthusiastic advocacy).
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ment on attorney-client relationships. 5 This survey will discuss
two recent decisions in which the United States Supreme Court
addressed Rule 11 for the first time. It is suggested that these de-
cisions have done little to resolve the areas of conflict surrounding
Rule 11 and have instead created additional areas of dispute.
I. COOTER & GELL v. HARTMARX CORP.
In Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp,, 6 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed three issues involving Rule 11. First, the majority af-
firmed a sanction imposed on an attorney subsequent to a volun-
tary dismissal of an action.18 Justice O'Connor, writing for the
Court, concluded that since a Rule 11 sanction does not involve a
decision on the merits, it is an issue "collateral" to the main cause
of action.19 Therefore, Rule 11 sanctions may be addressed after
the suit has been dismissed. 0 The Court reasoned that if an attor-
ney signs pleadings, motions or other documents in violation of
the rule, courts must have the authority to impose sanctions not-
withstanding the dismissal of the underlying action. 1 The Court
then addressed the standard of appellate review applicable to a
district court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions.2 Inconsistent
standards have been applied by the lower federal courts.2 8 The
10 See Vairo, supra note 2, at 196. "The encroachment into privileged areas that may
result from Rule 11 proceedings may weaken the attorney-client relationship." Id.;
Swindal, Frivolity in Court: New Rule 11, 13 LITIGATION 3, 4 (Summer 1987). The court, in
determining fault for the imposition of sanctions, must inquire into the facts. Id. This can
put the interests of the lawyer in conflict with the interests of the client. Id. This situation
can "jeopardize the attorney-client privilege." Id. It may result in the client "having to
retain independent counsel to represent himself against his attorney in satellite litigation."
Id. See also Joseph, Redrafting Rule 1l, Nat'l L. J., Oct. 1, 1990, at 13, 14 ("There may be
times when an attorney whose conduct is attacked will feel constrained, nevertheless, to
reveal client confidences in self-defense.").
16 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990).
17 Id. at 2447, 2449-51.
18 Id. at 2454-57.
1* Id. at 2456.
1o Id. at 2456-57. Justice O'Connor reasoned that allowing litigators to remove the
threat of Rule 11 sanctions by voluntarily dismissing the action would result in the loss of
.all incentive to . . . investigate more carefully before serving and filing papers." Id. at
2457 (quoting amendments to FED. R. Civ. P. 11, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 191-92 (1983)
(letter from Judge Walter Mansfield, Chairman, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules).
" Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2455.
2 Id. at 2457-61.
" Compare International Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of
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Court imposed an abuse-of-discretion standard of review upon all
aspects of a Rule 11 proceeding,"' applying this deferential stan-
dard to factual questions and legal issues as well as to the district
court's exercise of discretion in tailoring an "appropriate sanc-
tion."' 6 The Court recognized the difficulty in distinguishing be-
tween legal and factual issues, particularly with regard to Rule 11,
as the legal standard is fact dependent."6 The Court also empha-
sized that the district courts were better situated to determine a
signer's credibility, thus supporting the deferential standard of re-
view. 7 The majority noted that a judge considering a sanction
motion must examine all the circumstances of the case and con-
clude whether an attorney's pre-filing inquiry was reasonable. 8
The Court compared this level of inquiry to that of a determina-
tion in negligence. 9
It is suggested that the combination of a discretionary level of
appellate court review with the applicable standard of "reasona-
bleness under the circumstances" broadens the reach of Rule 11
sanctions. It is further suggested that this expansive reading per-
mits the imposition of sanctions for conduct which does not rise to
the level of abusiveness contemplated by the creators of the Rule.
Although the Court has established a uniform standard of review,
Am. (Airline Div.) v. Association of Flight Attendants, 864 F.2d 173, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(granting "wide discretion" to determine factual basis and existence of improper purpose
and applying de novo standard for questions of law) and Zaldivar v. Los Angeles, 780 F.2d
823, 828 (9th Cir. 1986) (reviewed findings of facts under clearly erroneous standard, Rule
11 violations under de novo standard, and appropriateness of sanction under discretionary
standard) and Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1174-75 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (same)
with Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 933 (7th Cir. 1989) (applied
deferential standard of review) and Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 861 F.2d 746, 757-
58 (1st Cir.) (same) and Teamsters Local Union No. 430 v. Cement Express, Inc., 841 F.2d
66, 68 (3d Cir.) (same), cert denied, 488 U.S. 848 (1988).
"* Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2461.
25 Id. at 2457.
"' Id. at 2458-59. For example, in determining "whether an attorney's prefiling inquiry
was reasonable," a court must consider "the time frame the attorney had to prepare a
complaint." Id. at 2459. In addition, the Court noted that the district court is more famil-
iar with the "local bar's litigation practices" and would therefore be in a better position to
know if sanctions were warranted. Id. Such deference "enhance[s] these courts' ability to
control the litigants before them." Id. See Mars Steel, 880 F.2d at 933 ("[d]istrict judges
have the best information about the patterns of their cases ...").
" Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2459-60 (citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552
(1988)).
Id. at 2457.
9 "Id.
425
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it has not succeeded in removing the subjective element inherent
in such review.3 0 The subjective good faith standard of old Rule
11 has been replaced by the subjective view of each individual
judge." It is submitted that under this standard, the lack of uni-
formity will result in inadequate notice to attorneys on the issue of
sanctionable conduct. 2 Attorneys may be sanctioned in one court
" See Swindal, supra note 15, at 4. "Under the guise of objectivity, one subjective stan-
dard has been substituted for another." Id. "Instead of the subjective good faith of the
lawyer, the governing standard now is the subjective view of hundreds of judges about how
a reasonable lawyer will act." Id. Cf Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739
(1982) (arguing that objective interpretation of legal norms is possible but only within "in-
terpretive community"); Vairo, supra note 2, at 194 (both language of amended rule and
Advisory Committee Notes contain highly subjective elements). Btt see Brown v. Federa-
tion of State Medical Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1435 (7th Cir. 1987) ("standard for imposing
sanctions under Rule 11 is an objective determination of whether a sanctioned party's con-
duct was reasonable under the circumstances"); Stevens v. Lawyers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co.,
789 F.2d 1056, 1060 (4th Cir. 1986) (new standard is objective test of reasonableness);
Albright v. Upjohn Co., 788 F.2d 1217, 1221 (6th Cir. 1986) (same); In re TCI Ltd., 769
F.2d 441, 445 (7th Cir. 1985) (same).
81 See Schwarzer, supra note 10 at 1016. "[W]hat a judge will find to be objectively un-
reasonable is very much a matter of that judge's subjective determination. Judges differ in
what they expect of lawyers and in the way they accommodate the values in tension in the
adversary system." Id. See also Minkoff, Reevaluating Rule 11, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 23, 1990, at 6,
col 2 (even within same case courts differ as to what constitutes sanctionable conduct). Cf.
W. PROSSER, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§32, at 173-74 (5th ed. 1984) (impossible to prefix definite rules for all conceivable con-
duct). Caselaw illustrates the many factors considered by judges toward a determination of
"objective good faith." See In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1183 (9th Cir.) (revei-sing district
court's imposition of sanctions which threatened balance between punishing improper be-
havior and discouraging vigorous advocacy), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 963 (1986); Huettig &
Schromm, Inc. v. Landscape Contractors Council, 582 F. Supp. 1519, 1522 (N.D. Cal.
1984) (court willing to hold specialized lawyers to higher standard of conduct than that of
average qualified attorney), affid, 790 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1986); Mossman v. Roadway
Express, 789 F.2d 804, 806 (9th Cir. 1986) (affirming imposition of sanctions but remand-
ing to reconsider amount of award); Eavenson, Auchmuty & Greenwald v. Holtzman, 775
F.2d 535, 544 (3d. Cir. 1985) (appellate court found that since attorney's conduct was sub-
ject to more than one reasonable interpretation, trial court's imposition of sanctions was
improper and reversed).
8' Carter, supra note 2, at 12 (arguing that standard of Rule 11 is not more "focused"
than it was and that old good faith standard remains); Cavanagh, Frivolous Litigation: Devel-
oping Standards Under Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 499, 514 (1986) ("new criteria for attorney conduct are somewhat amorphous"); El-
son & Rothschild, Rule 11: Objectivity and Competence, 123 F.R.D. 361, 363 (1988) ("[S]uch
'objective' requirements as that there be 'reasonable inquiry' and that the pleading be fac-
tually 'well grounded' and legally 'warranted' are hardly precise; each calls for the exercise
of individual judgment by the parties and by the court."); Note, supra note 7, at 350 (dis-
cussing factors that aid in determination of "reasonableness" and how "it is not surprising
that some judges find a particular type of behavior sanctionable while others find it permis-
sible"). Cf. Aminoil, Inc. v. United States, 646 F. Supp. 294, 298 (C.D. Cal. 1986) ("[w]hat
may be considered reasonable by one court may be found unreasonable by another"). See
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for conduct permitted in another.38 Additionally, attorneys may
find themselves sanctioned months, even years after the voluntary
dismissal of an action. 4
Lastly, the Court reversed the lower court's decision that the
defendants were entitled to reimbursement for attorney's fees in-
curred in defending a Rule 11 award on appeal." The majority
reasoned that neither the language nor the purpose of the rule
suggests application of the sanctions outside the scope of district
court proceedings. 6 The Court noted that such an interpretation
"would be likely to chill all but the bravest litigants from taking
an appeal."87 It is submitted that this "chilling effect" is not lim-
also supra notes 31-32 (discussion of inconsistency of standard applied by courts). But see
Note, Has a "Kajkaesque Dream" Come True, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1): Time For
Another Amendment?, 67 B.U.L. REV. 1019, 1026 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Kajkaesque Dream].
"In most of the cases in which Rule 11 violations are found, a reasonable attorney could
infer that the challenged litigation was frivolous." Id.
" See, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980) ("Like other sanc-
tions, attorney's fees certainly should not be assessed lightly or without fair notice and an
opportunity for a hearing on the record."); In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1183-84 (9th
Cir.) (when "circumstances lead the court to strongly suspect that a filed paper may not be
well-grounded in fact or law, the court should at a minimum provide notice to the certifying
attorney that Rule 11 sanctions will be assessed at the end of the trial if appropriate")
(emphasis in original), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 963 (1986). Cf. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City
of New York, 821 F.2d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 1986) (Pratt, J., dissenting) ("We should end the
misleading practice of justifying what are in reality punitive fines by pretending that they
represent attorney's fees."), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987). Sanctions that are excessive
in light of the surrounding circumstances may be construed as a penalty or fine and thus
raise due process concerns. Schwarzer, supra note 5, at 202. "[Cjourts need to be wary
about imposing fines under the rule." Id. "The criminal character of the fine brings into
play additional due process safeguards." Id. See also Levin & Sobel, supra note 8, at 606
("[D]ue process is required in order to impose sanctions."); Note, supra note 9, at 908
("[S]evere sanctions ... must comply with due process requirements ....").
" See, e.g., Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2447 (district court imposed sanctions more than
three years after dismissal of action). But cf. Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d
90, 100 (3d Cir. 1988) (all sanction motions must be filed as soon as practicable after dis-
covery of Rule 11 violation, but in no event later than entry of final judgment).
35 Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2461. The Court pointed out that a movant under Rule 11
is not entitled to fees other than those incurred at the trial level. Id. at 2462. To find
otherwise would promote appellate litigation. Id. See Orange Prod. Credit v. Frontline
Ventures, Ltd., 801 F.2d 1581, 1583 (9th Cir. 1986) (court denied claim for attorney's fees
incurred in defending appeal of Rule 11 sanctions); North Am. Watch Corp. v. Princess
Ermine Jewels, 786 F.2d 1447, 1451 (9th Cir. 1986) (same).
" Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2461. Attorney's fees incurred in defense of a baseless suit
are a direct result of a Rule 11 violation. Id. However, when a plaintiff appeals the imposi-
tion of Rule 11 sanctions, the "expenses incurred in defending the award on appeal are
directly caused by the district court's sanction and the appeal of that sanction." Id.
31 Id. at 2462. Courts of appeals have authority under Rule 38 to protect the benefi-
ciaries of Rule 11 sanctions by awarding costs and damages. Id. Thus, expanding Rule 11
Journal of Legal Commentary Vol. 5: 419, 1990
ited to the context of appeals. Rule 11 sanctions pose a substantial
threat to innovative or unpopular causes of action. 8 The result is
an adverse effect on creative advocacy, a cornerstone of the com-
mon law legal system. '9
Justice Stevens argued forcefully in dissent that the mere filing
of a complaint that is subsequently withdrawn does not impose a
sufficient burden on the court, in terms of needless expense and
delay, to justify a Rule 11 sanction.40 Imposing sanctions in such
actions can itself be an abuse of judicial resources since, in effect,
it forces the court to continue with the matter long after it has
been dismissed."' Furthermore, permitting sanctions after volun-
tary dismissal may discourage the voluntary dismissal of actions in
the future, thereby contravening the purpose of judicial efficiency
supporting the rule.4 '
protections to appellants is unnecessary. Id. Cf. Webster v. Sowders, 846 F.2d 1032, 1040
(6th Cir. 1988) (sanctions may be imposed under 28 U.S.C. 1912, 1927, FED. R. APP. P. 38);
Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1229 (6th Cir. 1986) (court may award attor-
ney's fees under 28 U.S.C. 1927, 42 U.S.C. 1988 or under courts' "inherent powers").
'" See Risinger, supra note 5, at 52-58 (concern that Rule 11 is potential threat to novel
or unpopular causes of action). See also Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp.,
801 F.2d 1531, 1540-41 (9th Cir. 1986) (overzealous use of Rule 11 sanctions should be
avoided to protect integrity of judicial system). Cf. Robinson v. National Cash Register Co.,
808 F.2d 1119, 1131 (5th Cir. 1987) (sanctions should not be imposed lightly due to im-
pact on attorney's reputation). See generally Nelken, supra note 11, at 1340-41 (discussion
of potential "chilling" effect of sanctions); Snyder, The Chill of Rule 11, 11 LITIGATION 16
(Winter 1985) (same). But see S. Medina, M. Henifin & T. Cone, A Preliminary Analysis of
Reported Decisions Applying the 1983 Amendment to Rules 11, 16, 26 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 17 (August 28, 1984) (unpublished paper available in Columbia
Law Library) (empirical research indicating courts are sensitive to "chilling" effect).
" See Golden Eagle, 801 F.2d at 1540 (conflict between "[l]awyer's duty zealously to re-
present his client . . . and lawyer's own interest in avoiding rebuke"); In re Yagman, 796
F.2d 1165, 1182 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 963 (1986) (sanctions not intended to chill
attorneys' creativity or enthusiasm). See also B. CARDOZO. THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 143
(1948) ("Law must be stable, and yet cannot stand still."); Snyder, supra note 38, at 55
("Punishing a lawyer for the legal theory he pleads is a dangerous game ... [as] it will...
stifle legitimate innovation, a result that the framers of Rule 11 never intended."); Weiss, A
Practitioner's Commentary on the Actual Use of Amended Rule 11, 54 FORDHAM L. REv. 23, 26
(1986) (Rule 11 sanctions inhibit lawyers' creative and aggressive style, thus shifting evolu-
tion of law).
" Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2464 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Stevens reasoned that the court is burdened only to the extent of a "notation.
on the court's docket sheet." Id.
41 Id. See also Joseph, Redrafting Rule 1, Nat'l L.J. 13, 14 (Oct. 1, 1990) ("If the parties
have agreed to dispose of the case, including sanctions issue, that should be the end of the
matter.").
" Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2464 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Mullenex, Justices
Clarified Courts' Role on Sanctions and Attorney Fees, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 10, 1990, at 25, 27
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Justice Stevens also noted the importance of interpreting the
mandates of Rule 1 1 as consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 41(a)."' Rule 41(a) was intended to permit a party to re-
consider its decision to file suit and to withdraw its complaint."
Justice Stevens commented that the majority's emphasis on the
textual language of Rule 11 and its reliance on plain meaning con-
travened the purpose of Rule 41(a) and "created a federal com-
mon law of malicious prosecution."' 5 Justice Stevens further pos-
ited that the majority's overbroad reading of Rule 11 was
unwarranted since the court has other means at its disposal for
dealing with unmeritorious pleadings.' Federal courts have the
equitable power to award attorney's fees to a successful party
whose opponent has acted in bad faith."7 Additionally, a court
may subject an attorney to contempt or disciplinary proceedings if
the attorney's conduct is sufficiently egregious."8 Expanding the
(recent holding that trial courts have authority to impose Rule 11 sanctions after voluntary
dismissal fairly criticized).
43 Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2463 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
44 Id.
45 Id.
" Id. at 2464 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
' See NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television & Radio, Inc., 894 F.2d 696 (sanctions were
not barred if offending conduct was not within reach of Rule 11 since court can assess
sanctions using it's inherent powers) cert. granted, 59 USLW 3243 (1990); Roadway Express
v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766-67 (1980) (general rule that litigant cannot recover counsel
fees does not apply when opposing party acted in bad faith); F. D. Rich Co., Inc. v. Indus-
trial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974) (fee-shifting triggered by bad faith); Hall v.
Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973) (same); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1272 (2d Cir.
1986) (same), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987). Our federal courts follow the "American
Rule" where each party must pay its own litigation costs. See Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wil-
derness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) (attorneys' fees not ordinarily recoverable); F. D.
Rich, 417 U.S. at 126 (same) (citing Fleischman Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386
U.S. 714, 717 (1967); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391 (1970) (same).
Exceptions to this rule exist to deter excessive or groundless litigation. See Alyeska, 421 U.S.
at 260 (exceptions to "American Rule"); F. D. Rich, 417 U.S. at 129 (same).
41 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 3.1, comment 2 (1989) (lawyer shall
not file suit when it is obvious such action merely serves to harass or maliciously injure
another). See generally Note, Kajkaesque Dream, supra note 32, at 1024-26 (discussing alter-
native means of limiting litigation abuse); supra note 8 (discussing alternative sanctions). Cf.
Porter v. Farmers Supply Serv., Inc., 790 F.2d 882, 887 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (appellant and
counsel sanctioned pursuant to FED. R. App. P. 38 and 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1982) for distorting
language in case cited on appeal). Another exception to the "American Rule" is contained
in 28 U.S.C. § 1927, which provides that an attorney "who so multiplies the proceedings..
• may be" personally liable for excess costs and attorney's fees that were reasonably in-
curred because of her actions. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988). These sanctions are permissible
and not mandatory. See id.
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bounds of Rule 11, concluded the dissent, would result in an un-
necessary waste of judicial resources and an "unwarranted perver-
sion of the Federal Rules." 4 Commentators criticizing Rule 11
have buttressed their position with similar reasoning. Several
commentators have remarked that courts already had the means
to deal with groundless or frivolous claims and that the imposition
of mandatory sanctions could potentially impose a burden that
clearly outweighs the benefits of Rule 11.51
II. PAVELIC & LEFLORE V. MARVEL ENTERTAINMENT GROUP
In another recent case, Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment
Group,5" the Supreme Court held that a sanction imposed on the
49 Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2464-65 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens refers
to the Court's refusal to read Rule 11 in conjunction with Rule 41(a)(l), which permits
plaintiff's voluntary withdrawal of a complaint. Id. This resulted in the court incorrectly
focusing on "filing of baseless complaints, without any attention to whether those com-
plaints will result in the waste of judicial resources." Id. at 2463 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens commented that by expanding the perimeters of Rule 11, the Court "cre-
ates a federal common law of malicious prosecution inconsistent with the limited mandate
of the Rules of the Enabling Act." Id. But see FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
It provides that "[tihe amended rule attempts ... [to] build upon and expand the equitable
doctrine permitting the court to award expenses, including attorneys fees, to a litigant
whose opponent acts in bad faith in instituting or conducting litigation." Id. (citing Road-
way Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980)); Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973) (bad
faith by opponent justifies award of counsel fees); Cf. Lepucki v. Van Wormer, 765 F.2d
86, 87 (7th Cir.) (good sense and integrity of lawyers will safeguard against danger of un-
manageable dockets), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 827 (1985).
8 See Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1540-42 (9th Cir.
1986) (excessive use of Rule 11 increases rather than reduces time and expense). See also
Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1481 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting that federal trial judges must
not take on "role of an active manager and director of the whole litigation process");
Weiss, supra note 39, at 27 ("[m]aking Rule 11 motions is bad, it is evil, and it is going to
hurt us all and adversely affect the judicial process"); Note, Kaflkaesque Dream, supra note
32, at 1040 (Rule 11 responsible for wasting court time and increasing delays). Cf. Coburn
Optical Indus., Inc. v. Cilco, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 656, 661 (M.D.N.C. 1985) (sanctions im-
posed for violating Rule 11 based on filing of frivolous Rule 11 motion itself); supra note
12 (discussing satellite litigation ensuing from Rule 11 sanctions).
81 See Bloomenstein, Developing Standards for the Imposition of Sanctions Under Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 21 AKRON L. REV. 289, 325 (1988). "[T]he intemperate
issuance of Rule 11 motions by the courts could make Rule 11 motions pro forma additions
to all actions." Id. "In this way, Rule 11 would add to the time and expense of a trial and
not reduce the cost in bringing claims to court." Id. Cf Schwarzer, supra note 10, at 1018
("Rule 11 has added substantially to volume of motions in district courts and appeals in
circuit courts"); Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100
HARv. L. REV. 630, 632 (1987) ("[r]eading [Rule 11] too broadly promotes efficiency only at
the cost of deterring undeveloped and nonstandard claims").
6 110 S. Ct. 456 (1989).
430
Survey of Professional Responsibility
"person who signed" a pleading, motion or other paper in viola-
tion of Rule 11, implicates the individual signer and not the "nat-
ural or juridical person on whose behalf the paper was signed." '
The Court held that Rule 11 imposes an affirmative non-delegable
duty on the individual signer." This responsibility, the Court con-
tended, was not furthered by the imposition of sanctions on the
signatory attorney's law firm.55 The Court reasoned that "the psy-
chological effects and economic deterrence" flowing from sanc-
tions on individual attorneys will result in a more certain standard
for district courts to follow and for attorneys to rely upon.58 The
Court grounded its analysis on the text of the rule itself. 7 The
majority reasoned that the reference in the rule to the "person
who signed" connoted an individual signer and thus the conse-
quences of such a signature "run as to him."5 8 The Court rejected
arguments based on traditional principles of partnership and
agency that support the imposition of liability on a law firm as well
as the individual attorney.59
It is suggested that in its analysis the Supreme Court ignored
11 Id. at 458.
Id. Justice Scalia premised his reasoning on the "plain meaning" of Rule 11. Id. (citing
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.9 (1980)). Following this statement,
Justice Scalia discussed possible alternative interpretations. Id.
Id. at 460. However, Justice Scalia acknowledged that sanctions imposed on the law
firm would "better guarantee reimbursement of the innocent party for expenses caused by
the Rule 11 violation." Id. The partnership's susceptibility to sanctions might induce it to
increase "internal monitoring." Id. See also E. Rothschild, R. Fenton, S. Swanson, Rule 11:
Stop, Think and Investigate, 11 LITIGATION 13, 15 (Winter 1985) ("The Advisory Committee
Notes suggest that lawyers should not incur sanctions for the mistakes of other lawyers.").
Cf. Colucci v. New York Times, 533 F. Supp. 1011 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (award that imposed
extreme hardship on attorney and would have forced him to file for bankruptcy was exces-
sive and unwarranted).
" Pavelic & LeFlore, 110 S. Ct. at 460.
" Id. at 459-60. The Court noted that the phrase "person who signed" is ambiguous. Id.
The Court viewed this phrase in the total context of Rule 11 as indicating the individual
attorney. Id.
Id. at 459 (italics omitted).
" Id. The Court noted that Rule 11:
departs from normal common-law assumptions such as that of delegability. The sign-
ing attorney cannot leave it to some trusted subordinate, or to one of his partners, to
satisfy himself that the filed paper is factually and legally responsible; by signing, he
represents not merely the fact that it is so, but also the fact that he personally has
applied his own judgment. Where the text establishes a duty that cannot be dele-
gated, one may reasonably expect it to authorize punishment only of the party upon
whom the duty is placed.
Id.
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the fact that very often the final product filed with the court is a
composite of the work of multiple attorneys.60 Ignoring this real-
ity, the Court has placed a potentially onerous burden squarely on
the shoulders of the individual attorney."1 Furthermore, it is sub-
mitted that the Court's decision will have a disparate impact on
the legal community. Monetary sanctions have the potential to
bankrupt sole practitioners and smaller law firms, while the large
firms have the financial resources to survive such sanctions.6 2 In
the lone dissent, Justice Marshall expressed his reluctance to ac-
cept the majority's reliance on the "plain meaning" of Rule 11 8
Justice Marshall found the wording of the statute susceptible to
other "reasonable interpretation. '6 4 Additionally, Justice Marshall
posited that the purposes of Rule 11 could be served by the impo-
sition of sanctions both on the individual attorney and the signer's
law firm.65 The dissent emphasized that the majority's narrow
reading of the "person" referred to in the statute could encroach
" Cf. Brief for Respondent, Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 110 S.
Ct. 456 (1989) (No. 89-275) (federal courts have routinely imposed sanctions against law
firm on whose behalf lawyer signed paper in violation of Rule 11). But see Schwarzer, supra
note 5, at 186-88 (discussing reasons why sanctions against law firms may be inappropriate).
41 Pavelic & LeFlore, 110 S. Ct. at 459-60 (discussing attorneys' non-delegable duties). Cf
Brief for Respondent, supra note 60 (sanctions on individual attorney allows other culpable
attorneys to escape sanctions). But see White v. General Motors, 908 F.2d 675 (10th Cir.
1990) (wrongdoer's ability to pay is one of factors considered by court when fashioning
sanctions).
U See Sanborn, Rule 11 Tremors Continue, Nat'l L.J., July 30, 1990, at 1 (discussing larg-
est Rule 11 sanctions against individual attorney in amount of $350,000 and potential
bankruptcy resulting from such large awards on small/solo practitioner). See generally Ga-
lanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 95 (1974) (arguing that system favors big corporate law firms - repeat players -
over solo practitioners).
" Pavelic & LeFlore, 110 S. Ct. 456, 460 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
" Id. The dissent commented that "in the context of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure" the word "person" can be reasonably interpreted to encompass more than just "nat-
ural person." Id. at 461 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Other statutes containing the word "per-
son" have been construed to encompass partnerships, associations, corporations and public
and private organizations. Id. See also supra, note 52 (discussing inconsistencies present in
majority's reliance on "plain meaning").
" Pavelic & LeFlore, 110 S. Ct. at 461 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "[E]ncouraging individ-
ual accountability and firm accountability are not mutually exclusive goals." Id.
"[I]ndividual accountability may be heightened when an attorney understands that his
carelessness or maliciousness may subject both himself and his firm to liability." Id. (empha-
sis deleted). The purpose of Rule 11 will best be served by apportioning the sanctions "be-
tween the signing attorney and his law firm, based on [the district court's] assessment of
the relative culpability of each." Id. at 462 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
432
Survey of Professional Responsibility
on the discretion of the courts in formulating appropriate sanc-
tions.66 Justice Marshall concluded that the holding of the major-
ity "ties the hands of a trial judge" by denying her the flexibility
essential to fashion appropriate sanctions.6 7
CONCLUSION
The Cooter & Gell68 and Pavelic & LeFlore6" decisions have
added significantly to the controversy surrounding Rule 11. It is
submitted that the Supreme Court's expansive reading of Rule 11
has broadened the reach of sanctions beyond its proper role in
discouraging abusive litigation tactics. It is suggested that Rule 11
should be further amended, narrowly tailoring the language of
the rule to address only abusive conduct without chilling creative
advocacy. It is further suggested that Rule 11 be amended to per-
mit attorneys, with immunity from sanctions, to withdraw legally
or factually inadequate pleadings within the mandates of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). It is submitted that without further
amendment to Rule 11, the ramifications of Cooter & Gell and
Pavelic & LeFlore cast lingering uncertainty on the Rule's benefits,
in light of its burden on individual attorneys and the courts.
Monica M. Bartow
Id. "Flexibility is... important when a judge decides whether one, some, or all of the
many entities before him should be held responsible for improper pleadings, motions or
papers." Id. "The judge who observes improper behavior and who is intimately familiar
with the facts of a case should be allowed to fashion the penalty that most effectively deters
future abuse." Id. See also FED. R. CIv. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97
F.R.D. 165, 201 (1983). "In many situations the judge's participation in the proceedings
provides him with the full knowledge of the relevant facts .... I" d.
" Pavelic & LeFlore, 110 S. Ct. at 462 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
" Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990).
' Pavelic & Leflore, 110 S. Ct. 456 (1989).
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